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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation, at the International Hellenic 
University. 
Innovation has become a buzzword of EU policy in the last decade. The prevalence of 
this term is even more intense in EU competition law, where innovation-related 
literature is at its spike. There is, however, one aspect of the relation between 
innovation and competition that remains rather underexplored by literature and 
policy. That is competition concerns raised in mergers between an incumbent and an 
innovative start-up, which merger will not have an immediate effect on the relevant 
market structure.  
This thesis finds that the current EU merger control model is incapable of drawing such 
mergers under its scope, due to its static nature and its indirect assessment of 
innovation concerns. This way, a significant amount of concentrations potent of 
causing impediments to effective competition remain uncontrolled. This thesis also 
proposes the introduction of a dynamic contemplation of innovation-based mergers, 
which would allow the assessment of their long-term effects on innovation, and the 
activation of respective remedies. 
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Introduction – Promotion of Innovation as an Objective of EU Policy 
Much ink has been spilled in the “Battle for the Soul of Antitrust”1. There have 
been many different approaches as to which political and economic goals competition 
law should pursue, and how these goals are better served. The objectives of any given 
national competition law may vary from time to time and are aligned with that State´s 
socio-economical conceptions. However, if one inference had to be drawn from that 
“battle”, it would be that competition law, perhaps more than any other field of law, is 
in fact being utilized as a means to pursue political and economic goals. 
The European Union is no exception in harnessing competition law in the 
prosecution of political and economic aims. Although not manifesting its objectives 
explicitly, it has by now been well documented in practice and case law that EU 
Competition law orbits mainly around principles as promoting consumer welfare and 
market efficiency23. From a systemic point of view, the EU adopts an economic policy 
which is aligned with the “principle of an open market economy with free 
competition”4. 
In the past decade, however, the EU policy has manifested a remarkable 
interest in endorsing concepts such as entrepreneurship and innovation, as the core of 
its strategy to recover from the economic crisis. Indeed, the EU contemplates 
innovation and entrepreneurship as valuable means to create economic wealth an 
restore Europe´s international competitiveness. In this light, the Union currently puts 
vast efforts and funds through various policies, intended to improve its ecosystem for 
entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Empirically, the process of innovation is highly dispersed in the markets. 
Conceiving and planning an idea that might have a fundamental impact on the markets 
is a matter of talent and flair, and does not require -at least at this point- the disposal 
of capital and infrastructure as a prerequisite. Therefore, breakthrough innovations 
often come from completely new entrants to the market, whose reason of entry is to 
                                                 
1 Fox E.M., The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 917 (1987). 
2 Monti G., EC Competition Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), p. 83 
3 Ezrachi A., EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy, BEUC Discussion Paper, (2018), p. 4 
4 Art. 119 TFEU.  
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make profit of that idea5. The implementation of the innovative idea, however, is 
much more demanding, since this phase requires specialized personnel, managerial 
skills, know-how regarding the relevant market, and of course funding. But even when 
this phase of the innovation process has been successfully mastered, the innovative 
project must be launched to the market and be effectively commercialized, by 
surpassing any market entry barriers. It is usually this stage of market introduction of 
the innovative project that poses the most difficulties to a start-up, since the entry 
barriers in innovation-based markets are usually high6. This, in turn, creates the 
obvious incentive for startups to develop their innovative projects up to the possible 
extent, and then sell out to a market incumbent, which will be in a position to finalize 
and commercialize the innovation more effectively7.  
At the same time, the incumbents in an innovation-based product market that 
is prone to disruptive innovation, will always have an interest to acquire such 
innovative projects8 that may have an impact on the status quo of the market where 
they are competing. This usually happens at a price very attractive to the 
entrepreneur. In fact, a breakthrough innovation may be a game-changer in a given 
product market, since it might have the capacity to alter the current market shares of 
the competitors to the benefit of the firm holding the innovative project, and thus 
define the market leader9. Incumbents, therefore, have the incentive not only to 
innovate themselves, but to also acquire promising innovative projects from startups, 
in order to A. deprive their competitors from gaining access to that project first, and B. 
to make use of that innovative asset in the context of competition against the other 
incumbents, in order to secure a greater market share10 and, hence, higher profits. 
There interests shall be referred to as interest A. and B. for future reference. 
The issue arises when the acquiring firm contents itself to interest A., i.e. to 
solely keep the disruptive innovation away from its competitors, or to prevent a new 
competitor from being born, mainly because that firm already holds a dominant 
                                                 
5 OECD – Considering non-price effects in merger control – Background note by the Secretariat, 
DAF/COMP(2018)2, p. 8 
6 Tesink W., Barriers on market introduction of innovative products, University of Twente. 
7 Phillips G.M., Zhdanov A., R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity, (2012). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Marshall G., Parra A., Mergers in Innovative Industries: The Role of Product Market Competition, (2017), 
p. 3. 
10 Supra 5, p. 7 
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position in the market, as well as the desired market share vis-à-vis its competitors. In 
this case the acquiring incumbent may have no interest to deploy capital and human 
resources for the further development and market introduction of that innovation 
being developed by the disruptive start-up (often being referred to as “maverick 
firm”11). This is because the acquiring incumbent would not anticipate any significant 
returns from these efforts, given the fact that it already holds the desired market 
share, while the introduction of the new, innovative product to the market could also 
cause cannibalization of its profits by replacing that firm´s products already established 
in the market. In this light, the interests of the acquiring firm are best served by 
acquiring the innovative project and simply shutting it down. This practice has been 
referred to as a “killer acquisitions”12. 
This, of course, creates a constellation which undoubtedly causes 
considerations to the administrative authorities; as it has been mentioned above, and 
as will be further analyzed in the next chapter, the EU has devoted significant 
organizational efforts and funds to see that innovative maverick firm sprouting. When 
the latter succeeds in developing an idea that attracts the market´s attention, and 
which thereby by inference has the potential to open new markets, create new jobs 
and overall produce welfare, the administration sees that potential being defused by a 
market dominant in an anticompetitive manner. It is therefore clear that an interest in 
intervention exists on behalf of the administrative authority.  
There has been, however, much literature on when and under which conditions 
administrative intervention in mergers and acquisitions of innovative startups should 
be warranted13, since there are utterly fine balances to be kept. On the one hand, as 
seen above, there is the interest of the administrative authority to maintain 
competition levels and to combat abusive practices on behalf of the dominant 
incumbent. On the other hand, there are the interests of the entrepreneur, who 
conceived the idea in the first place, and seeks for a lucrative exit from his or her 
innovative project; and selling the startup to an incumbent of the mainstream market 
is one of the most usual ways to achieve entrepreneurial exit. Overregulating merger 
                                                 
11 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, (2004/C 31/03), para. 42.  
12 Cunningham C., Ederer F., Ma S., Killer Acquisitions, (2018). 
13 Sokol D.D., Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217095.  
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control in innovative startups, and thereby constricting exit opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, would have quite the adverse effects from the ones pursued by the 
respective policies implemented by the EU, as it would afflict the entrepreneurs´ 
incentives, and thereby render the EU an innovation-hostile market.  
In this dissertation I examine the current considerations regarding acquisitions 
of innovative start-ups, and in particular the practice of innovation-dumping 
acquisitions. The findings are that this aspect of the broader topic of the relation 
between mergers and innovation is underexplored. In order to stress out the political 
aspect of these considerations, I dedicate a brief chapter to the policies currently 
undertaken by the EU to promote innovation, and how these policies interrelate with 
EU competition policy. In the second Chapter, I review the main literature on the 
relation between market competition and incentives to innovate, while citing empirical 
evidence that acquisitions of innovative startups with the aim of dumping their 
innovative efforts, are in fact an existent matter. Subsequently, I examine whether the 
current EU approach on innovation-based merger control is sufficient to encounter this 
phenomenon, and what recent steps have been taken towards adjusting merger 
control to innovation-based concerns. In another chapter the role of innovation 
considerations in administrative intervention in the EU is explored. In the final part, 
the adoption of a dynamic contemplation of innovation-based mergers control is 
proposed.  
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1. Promotion of Innovation as an Objective of EU Policy 
In the post economic crisis era, few policy fields in the EU attract the spotlight 
as much as the fields of entrepreneurship and innovation. Indeed, the EU currently 
runs various action plans and strategies which aim to boost the creation and 
development of SMEs, as well as to promote innovation and create an innovation-
friendly environment in the single market.  
In fact, the economic crisis experienced in the EU from 2008 and on, left the 
Member States with over 25 million unemployed and a devastated environment for 
SME‘s14. The reignition of entrepreneurship is being viewed as a key measure to 
encounter the still ongoing reverberations of the crisis, as it is anticipated to have a 
positive impact on economic growth and job creation in the EU15. To this direction, the 
Commission has taken up numerous initiatives, such as the “Entrepreneurship 2020 
Action Plan” and the “Start-up, Scale-up Initiative”, which seek to foster 
entrepreneurship by implementing measures that mainly facilitate access to finance, 
improve the business environment for start-ups by dealing with bureaucratic 
impediments, and offer second chances to failed start-up attempts.  
Innovation, on the other hand, is also contemplated by the Commission as a 
key factor to enhance European competitiveness in the global market, which, in turn, 
is expected to lead to the creation of new jobs and to economic prosperity. This is 
particularly highlighted in the Commission Communication titled “For a European 
Industrial Renaissance”16, where the importance of industry for the prosperity of the 
EU is stressed, since it accounts for 80% of Europe’s exports. In this context, it is 
inferred that the modernization and evolution of the European industry, which is by 
and large a product of the uptake of innovation in the market, is crucial to its 
competitiveness in the global market, and by extension, to the prosperity of Europe. 
Acknowledging the key-role it plays in maintaining European welfare, the 
Commission is currently running various initiatives to promote innovation and its 
                                                 
14 Communication from the Commission “Entrepreneurship 2020 action plan”, COM (2012) 795 final of 
January 2013, p. 3. 
15 Communication from the Commission “Towards a job-rich recovery”, 18.4.2012, COM(2012) 173 final. 
16 Communication from the Commission „For a European Industrial Renaissance, 22.1.2014, COM(2014) 
14 final.  
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uptake in the market. In fact, the Union´s interest in promoting research and 
development, and its commitment to adopt the respective policy measures is 
enshrined in Art. 179 to 190 TFEU.  
The main instrument in implementing those policies are the framework 
programmes, which manifest the goals and priorities of the Union for a given, 
multiannual period, and provide for the respective funding. The Europe 2020 
Communication from the Commission17, which manifests the objectives and priorities 
to be achieved in the current decade, identifies the lower rates of innovation as one of 
the causes of Europe´s lower growth rates, compared to its economic partners, and 
stresses out the importance of policies encouraging innovation for maintaining 
Europe´s international competitiveness. In this context, the Europe 2020 strategy 
launched one of its flagship initiatives named Innovation Union18, which is a 
comprehensive framework programme, aiming at fostering innovation in all its stages, 
i.e. from conceiving the idea until commercializing it.  
The dedication of the Union to implement the policies dictated by Innovation 
Union, is made clear through the financial instrument of that framework programme, 
namely Horizon 2020,19 which is a research and discovery programme with almost 80 
bn. Euro of funding available until 2020. Notably, an important part of the Horizon 
2020 programme focuses especially on innovation in SMEs, manifesting how the EU 
values the smaller players when it comes to generating innovative projects.  
In light of the above, it is clear that promotion of innovation has taken its place 
as a key consideration of the post-crisis policy of the EU, with the latter putting a lot of 
organizational effort and funding into pursuing that consideration. What is also clear is 
that such fundamental political initiatives may not leave competition policy indifferent. 
All the more, the Europe 2020 Communication has made it explicit that one of the 
objectives of competition policy is to “ensure that markets provide the right 
environment for innovation” as well as “to incentivise innovation”20. 
                                                 
17 Communication from the Commission, “Europe 2020”, 03.03.2010, COM(2010) 2020. 
18 Communication from the Commission, “Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative – Innovation Union”, 
06.10.2010, COM(2010) 546 final 
19 Communication from the Commission, “Horizon 2020 – The Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation”, COM(2011) 808 final.  
20 Supra 17, p. 19. 
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2. The Relation Between Competition and Innovation 
The importance of innovation to the competition of a given market has been 
asserted long ago. However, as we have been advancing more and more into the 
digital age, innovation considerations vis-à-vis market competition have been 
progressively centered under the spotlight of competition authorities and 
policymakers21. In fact, since the past few decades there have been plenty of cases 
where competition authorities in the EU and the US were confronted with theoretical 
questions (usually in the context of proposed merger investigations) such as how 
market structure affects innovative efforts of the competing firms, and under which 
market conditions the competitors´ incentives to innovate are best served. Despite the 
fact that these questions have been around for quite a while, there is by now no clear-
cut answer22.  
This nebulous interrelation between market concentration and innovation has 
placed a gordian knot, many valiant economists have put their efforts into solving ever 
since. The pursuit of finding a formula which would shed light on the link between 
market competition and incentives to innovate has in turn fueled an exciting 
theoretical debate, which is still ongoing and of course relevant today.  
Market Concentration and Incentives to Innovate 
Nearly every attempt to analyze the link between competition and incentives 
to innovate begins with a reference to Joseph Schumpeter, who was probably the first 
to methodically examine the connection between those two notions23, and has not 
unjustly been referred to as “The Prophet of Innovation”24.  
In a simplification of Schumpeter´s view, the lower the competitive pressure 
faced by a given firm in a given market, the more its incentives to innovate are 
                                                 
21 Kern, B., R. Dewenter, and W. Kerber (2016), “Empirical Analysis of the Assessment of Innovation Effects 
in U.S. Merger Cases”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol. 16. 
22 Gilbert, R. “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?” 
Innovation policy and the economy (2006), 6: p. 206. 
23 Schumpeter J.A., Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy, Routledge London & New York, 1942.  
24 McCraw T.K., “Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction”, Harvard University 
Press.  
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endorsed. In this view, when a firm faces aggressive competition, it will be urged to 
devote its resources and efforts in surviving that competition, thus being stripped of 
the necessary “convenience” to invest in innovative projects. Schumpeter makes this 
inference by observing that nearly every breakthrough innovation of his age, which 
had a positive impact in the quality of life of the consumers, is to be attributed to the 
large-scale firms of a given innovation-based market, rather than to the small 
players25. By implying that large firms are most usually located in concentrated 
markets, Schumpeter identifies a link between market concentration and innovation 
output, in the sense that the more concentrated a market is, the more conducive are 
the conditions for the innovative efforts of that market´s firms.  
Schumpeter finds that, in a concentrated market, the driving force behind the 
efforts of a firm to innovate is the prospect of achieving market dominance through 
that innovation, and, subsequently, exploiting that dominance to the maximum extent, 
so as to increase its profit margins. Hence, in the Schumpeterian view, the incentives 
to innovate are generated by the interest of a firm to cause imperfect competition 
conditions in that market, to its own benefit. Schumpeter therefore suggests that 
policies aiming at correcting these imperfections are counterbalancing the firms´ 
incentives to innovate. Instead, some degree of competition imperfection has to be 
allowed26, in order to increase the stakes in competition for innovation: by awarding to 
the market dominant the price of (some degree of) dominance exploitation, one also 
increases the incentives of the competing firms to overthrow this dominant through 
innovation, taking its place and reaping in turn the fruits of that innovation.  
Kenneth Arrow, on the other hand, has expressed a view which has for long 
been (and still is being) contemplated in literature as the exact opposite to the above 
theory27. He identifies that in a monopolistic market, full appropriability of the 
innovation by the monopolist, meaning its full exploitation by the inventor only, could 
indeed increase the incentives of the latter to innovate. However, Arrow finds that this 
appropriability effect is offset by the monopolist´s disincentive to engage in costly R&D 
projects, while already dominating the market. In other words, the only effect of that 
                                                 
25 Supra 23, p. 82.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Arrow, K., “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention.” In The Rate and Direction 
of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press (1962). 
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firm introducing a new product in the market, would be the displacement of its own 
previously established product. This cannibalization effect is according to Arrow what 
deters a market dominant from innovating, since it can maintain its market position 
and profits without the need to engage in innovative efforts. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that a firm having already secured a desired market share and achieving 
lucrative profits, will lack incentives to innovate, and will rather have an interest to 
maintain the current status in the market. By inference, it is according to Arrow the 
intensity of product market competition, or in other words uncertainty about one´s 
future market position, that will lead an incumbent firm to innovate.  
More Recent Approaches 
In the past few years, as innovation-centred policies and economic 
considerations have again invigorated the debate about the link between competition 
and innovation, new semantic approaches on this issue have appeared, which 
compose and decompose the pioneer theories mentioned above.  
For instance, Aghion et al. propose a nonlinear model, where the relation 
between product market competition and innovation output takes the form of an 
inverted U-shape28. According to that model, innovation in a market increases with the 
increase of product market competition, however only up to a certain point. Beyond 
that point of competition intensity, any further increase in competitive constrains will 
have as a result a decrease in innovation output, giving an inverted U-shape to the 
chart. According to this view, it is the markets with more neck-to-neck competitors 
which provide for more conducive conditions for innovation, whereas the small 
players, as well as the dominant firms will generally have less incentives to innovate.  
Carl Shapiro, on the other hand, in his seminal contribution to the relevant 
debate29, departs from theories that bind innovation output to the product market 
competition, and rejects the logic of a universal theory able to explain the link 
between competition and innovation. Furthermore, Shapiro finds that the 
Schumpeterian and the Arrovian views are not at all conflicting, but rather mutually 
                                                 
28 Aghion, P., et al., “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 120 No.2 (2005).  
29 Shapiro, C., “Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?” in The Rate and Direction of 
Inventive Activity Revisited, J. Lerner and S. Stern (eds.), University of Chicago Press (2012). 
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complementing in their core. Indeed, Shapiro identifies that there is truth in Arrows 
view that a firm with a secured market share has in general less incentives to innovate, 
rather than to maintain the current status in the market. Schumpeter´s view, on the 
other hand, that the driving force behind innovation is the firm´s anticipation of 
market power, is also granted. Shapiro finds that the common point between those 
two theories is that innovation is favoured in a market that is contestable, in the sense 
that a number of firms compete to extort future sales from one another30.  
In that light, Shapiro introduces three stand-alone principles, namely the 
“Contestability”, the “Appropriability” and the “Synergies” principles, which are 
consistent with both the Schumpeterian and the Arrovian view, and which provide a 
comprehensive guide in assessing the levels of innovation incentives in a given market. 
The Contestability principle refers to the mutual efforts of a market´s competing firms 
to extort sales from one another, by enhancing the value offered to consumers. 
Rationally, where there is contestability, there are incentives to innovate. The 
Appropriability principle focuses on the innovating firm´s capacity to preserve the 
benefits of its innovation for itself, avoiding imitations and spill-overs in the market to 
the possible extent. Why appropriability is a sine qua non to a firm´s incentives to 
innovate, is easily understandable. Last but not least, the Synergies principle is 
somewhat to a counterbalance to appropriability, which suggests that the composition 
of diverse ideas and assets deriving from diverse market players, is vital to the 
innovation process. Shapiro puts the Synergies principle to the “ability” end of the 
innovation equilibrium, rather the “incentives” one, where the other two principles are 
placed. In fact, the combination of diverse human resources and the integration of 
ideas spilling over from the rest of the market is attributed to a firm´s capacity to 
innovate, whereas the incentive to do so is in this case presupposed. 
The Impact of Mergers on the Incentives to Innovate 
The relation between competition and innovation is contemplated by the 
competition authorities profoundly in the frame of merger control. That is, if 
innovation levels matter for an economy, competition authorities will have a ground to 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 401.  
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scrutinize the impact of a proposed merger between two innovation-based firms on 
the incentives to innovate, mainly in regard to the merged firms, but also as to their 
competitors. Although the abovementioned pioneer economic theories on the relation 
between competition and innovation may provide valuable guidance to this purpose, it 
has been argued31 that they do not suffice in illustrating the consequences a merger 
might cast on the relevant market´s innovative incentives. Therefore, there is currently 
a dynamic debate in progress, which consists of literature aiming to inform 
competition authorities on the particularities of this matter, by setting up theories on 
when innovation is harmed in the context of a merger and suggesting the relevant 
evidence to be taken into consideration in this regard.  
For instance, Federico et al.32 find that a merger between two firms competing 
in innovation will always have a negative impact on the merging firms´ incentives to 
innovate post-merger. This is attributed mainly to the fact the pre-merger innovation 
competition between the two firms at hand is seized after the merger. In other words, 
prior to the merger the relevant firms compete in innovation in order to appropriate 
shares of the costumer bases from one another. This contest is internalized after the 
merger and, hence, muted. Federico et al. purposely leave pro-innovation efficiencies 
induced by a merger out of scope, so as to measure only the incentives, rather than 
the ability of the merged firm to innovate. Finding that there is a consistently negative 
relation between mergers and innovation levels post-merger, Federico et al. argue that 
the inverted-U shape is not relevant when considering merger cases. 
Jullien and Lefouili, on the other hand, advocate against the predisposition that 
a merger will unilaterally cast a negative effect on innovation33. While starting from 
the same point as Federico et al., i.e. that a merger causes internalization of the 
competitive constraints casted by the merging parties against each other, which might 
decrease the incentives to innovate, Jullien and Lefouili identify another effect which 
might cause quite the opposite outcome. In a somewhat Schumpeterian approach, 
these authors argue that the decreased levels of product market competition which 
                                                 
31 Jullien, B., Lefouili Y., “Horizontal Mergers and Innovation”, (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3135177.  
32 Federico, G., Langus G., Valletti T., “A simple model of mergers and innovation”, CESifo Working Papers 
No. 6539, (2017). 
33 Supra 31, p. 26.  
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take place after the merger, will grant the merged entity the ability to extract higher 
profits from its future products, thus invigorating its interest to innovate. The net 
effect between those two counterbalancing forces has to be assessed in a case by case 
scenario. Hence, Jullien and Lefouili argue that a given merger, although it will almost 
certainly silence the negative externalities casted between the merging parties prior to 
the merger, may nonetheless also have positive effects, which might even prevail. 
Therefore, these authors suggest that competition authorities should as a rule have a 
neutral stance vis-à-vis innovation based mergers, and reckon not only the negative 
effects to the incentives to innovate, but also the positive ones in each concrete case.  
This approach is in line with Shapiro34, who also examines the connection 
between competition and innovation in light of a merger-setting. Shapiro also argues 
that a negative “contestability” effect of a merger (which might be considered as the 
equivalent to the internalization of negative externalities referred to by Jullien and 
Lefouili) might be superseded by a positive appropriability and synergies effect, which 
might render a merger overall beneficial to innovation.  
Motta and Tarantino, other than Jullien and Lefouili, do not find that relaxed 
competition, as a result of the merger, will increase the merged entity´s anticipation of 
higher profits, and will thus lead it to more vigorously invest in upcoming products35. 
On the contrary, they argue that if a merger does not lead to significant cost savings to 
the merged entity, the latter will as a rule increase prices and cut on investments. 
However, Motta and Tarantino do not denounce the possibility of a merger´s overall 
positive effect of innovation, provided that it comes with a significant degree of 
efficiency allocations.  
In all, it is safe to conclude that when considering the effects of a merger on the 
incentives to innovate, the majority of the relevant literature does not suggest a 
monodimensional approach. Rather, the leading message to be extracted is that, 
depending on the particularities of each market and each separate case, a merger 
between two firms competing in innovation might as well incentivise innovation 
efforts.  
                                                 
34 Supra 29, p. 368 
35 Motta, M., Tarantino E., “The Effect of Horizontal Mergers, When Firms Compete in Prices and 
Investments” (2017), www.eief.it/files/2017/09/motta.pdf.  
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Mergers Between Non-Competing Firms 
Although the above-cited theories on the relation between mergers and 
incentives to innovate might be to a greater or a lesser extent mutually contradicting, 
they all have one characteristic in common: all of them rely on the paradigm of a 
merger between firms competing on the same level. Indeed, those theories deal with 
the conventional considerations of competition harm revoked when two competing 
firms decide to merge. The sole difference from a conventional merger case in this 
paradigm is that the merging parties do not compete only on price cutting or product 
output, but also on innovation output.  
There is, however, another way in which mergers in the broader sense and 
incentives to innovate correlate, which remains largely underexplored in literature. 
This refers to the paradigm of an acquisition of an innovation-based start-up by an 
incumbent firm. In their ground-breaking paper, Phillips and Zhdanov explore the 
relation between mergers of firms not competing on the same level of a product 
market, and innovation36. They find that there is a well-defined business strategy of 
large firms to “buy” innovation from start-up companies, complementary to the R&D 
conducted by themselves. Their model is based on evidence compatible with Arrow’s 
theory, that in general larger firms manifest less incentives to engage in costly R&D 
programmes than a start-up, since them already holding a significant market share 
disincentivises them to engage in expensive, yet potentially unsuccessful innovation 
efforts. On the other hand, however, the profits an incumbent firm might anticipate 
from a successful innovation are substantially higher than those a start-up could 
achieve, as Jullien and Lefouili have noted37, by expanding the Schumpeterian theory. 
Start-ups located in innovation-based markets, in turn, are literally driven by the 
incentive to successfully innovate, so as to attract the attention of some large firm of 
the market, which would possibly lead to their acquisition and, thus, to a lucrative exit 
for the entrepreneurs behind that start-up.  
These conditions create an optimal innovation ecosystem: incumbent firms, 
although not being too eager to invest in R&D projects themselves, do have the 
interest to leave space for start-up firms to innovate. That way, incumbents may 
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acquire the successful innovative projects, reaping the fruits of the efforts of an 
efficient start-up, without having to bear the costs of unsuccessful projects. Start-ups, 
in turn, when located in a market with high acquisition activity, have strong incentives 
to develop innovative projects, which might have them showing up in the radars of 
some market giant, possibly ending up with the coveted acquisition. As long as this 
acquisition-powered cycle is sustained, the market at hand will grant sufficient 
incentives to new start-ups entering it and undertaking innovative efforts – an optimal 
outcome from an economic perspective.  
However, this approach of a pacific cooperation between an innovation-based 
market’s incumbents and new entrants, although unveiling an important, hitherto 
latent facet of such markets, does not deal with the other half of the truth. In fact, the 
application of Phillips and Zhdanov’s model predisposes that the start-up’s innovation 
efforts are aligned with a given incumbent firm’s interests and business strategy. On 
the contrary, where a start-up turns these efforts to a direction that is contradicting 
the incumbent’s interests, there we will have pure, offensive competition, albeit 
between different level players.  
Bower and Christensen’s seminal work propose a partition of the term 
“innovation”, which is very useful in illustrating the above differentiation38. They 
define between sustaining and disruptive innovation.  
In the first case, minor improvements are applied to products already 
established in the market, in order to refresh them and maintain their appeal to 
costumers. Consider for example the smartphone industry; in an almost strictly 
programmed annual basis, each major firm will present a “highly innovative” new 
model, which aspires to “redefine the industry”. Without intending to deny the 
technological progress achieved through sustaining innovation in the long run, the 
outcome of that annual innovation will most usually be a redefined version of last 
year’s model, with slightly thinner bezels and a few extra software add-ons. 
Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, do in fact have the potential to turn 
a market upside-down, refuting the status quo and redefining the market leaders, or 
even create a whole new market, with firms racing anew to take their position therein. 
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And it will, understandably, be the firm holding that disruptive innovation, which will 
have the head-start in this race. To remain in the mobile phone sector, consider for 
example the collapse of the cell-phone market as a result of the introduction of the 
smartphone, which created a whole new market, with new market leaders39 .  
There is, rationally, an interest on behalf of incumbent firms in an innovation-
based market, to opt for the pace of sustaining innovation. This way, a firm might 
maximize the value extracted from its products already established in the market, by 
extending their life-cycle, through applying minor optimizations at a regular pace, and 
putting efforts on marketing those as ground-breaking innovations. This strategy also 
offers minimum cannibalization of that firm’s own profits, which would incur should a 
disruptive product be introduced in the market, and “prematurely” displace the 
currently marketed one.  
In regard to sustaining innovation, Phillip and Zhdanov’s model might in fact be 
relevant; Incumbent firms may actually have an interest to acquire such type of 
innovation from market entrants, in order to apply and utilize it in the context of 
competition with their level-playing competitors. However, when the discussion is 
about the more aggressive counterpart of innovation, i.e. the disruptive one, which is 
not being developed as a good to be sold to an incumbent firm, but which has the 
potential to provoke a turmoil in a particular market, the conclusions might be quite 
different. 
Interests of Incumbent Firms vis-à-vis Disruptive Innovation 
 If we try to decompose and simplify the interests of an incumbent firm, when 
opposed with a disruptive innovation about to enter the market where the former is 
competing, we will find that these interests will basically be two. The first one would 
be to avoid this innovation being used against itself in competition, by depriving its 
competitors from gaining access to it (interest A.). The second interest would be for 
that firm to deploy itself that innovation against its competitors, by further developing 
and ultimately launching it into the market (interest B.). The goal, as always, is to 
capture a larger market share and thereby increase profits.  
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Interest A. will generally be ever-present in such a case. Indeed, an incumbent 
firm, when realizing that a new idea, potent of disrupting the status quo of the market 
is about to spawn, being uncertain about the possible outcome in case that idea 
should fall into the hands of a competitor, will naturally have an interest to acquire it 
first, so as to assure that it is not going to be deployed against itself. This interest is 
compatible with Schumpeter’s view40, that a dominant firm’s competitors in an 
innovative market will seek to overthrow that dominant through innovation, so as to 
take its position on top of the market hierarchy. The dominant firm will insofar have a 
counter-interest to keep game-changing innovations away from its competitors. 
Interest B., however, is subject to the firm’s incentives to take on innovation efforts 
post-merger, as illustrated by the relevant theories cited above. 
This situation automatically leads to the problematic occurring when on the 
one hand a firm has the incentives to acquire a potential market disruptor, to avoid 
competition through the latter’s innovation, but on the other hand that firm already 
holds a more or less dominant position in the market, so that the commercialization of 
that innovation is not to its interests.  
If Arrow was right in that an incumbent firm already holding a sufficient market 
share will lack incentives to innovate, for fear of cannibalizing its own profits through 
that innovation, then we might as well take that theory another step further: the firm 
of Arrow’s model, which lacks interest to innovate itself, will by inference most 
probably have an interest to also actively dump incoming disruptive innovation by 
third parties for the same reasons41. Put differently, the passive disincentive of a 
market leader to innovate itself, might also imply an interest to actively harness third-
party innovation entering the relevant market. That is, any market leader will by 
definition have an interest to acquire potentially threatening innovators, to avoid the 
fulfilment of Schumpeter’s creative destruction theory42, and see itself succumbing to 
its competitors. According to Arrow’s model, however, that market leader will also lack 
interest to launch that acquired innovation into the market, since it would probably 
only cut off profits from its already established products.  
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Insofar, in a combination of Schumpeter’s and Arrow’s theories, we can suggest 
that an incumbent firm in an innovation-based market, already enjoying a sufficient 
market share, might vis-à-vis a disruptive innovation that is about to enter its market, 
have the incentives to acquire that innovation only to mute it ever after. This of course 
leads to a practice which raises serious competition concerns, as the overall result, 
stripped from incentives and interests, is a dominant firm actively acquiring maverick 
firms in order to dump disruptive innovations about to enter the market, and thus 
secure its dominant position.  
Empirical Evidence  
In maybe the first attempt to thoroughly examine the practice described above, 
Cunningham et al43. provide valuable empirical evidence that “killer acquisitions”, as 
they name them, is in fact an acquisition strategy followed by innovation-based 
markets’ incumbents. In order to do so, they wisely focus on the pharmaceutical 
industry, which offers various safeguards to allow the drawing of firm conclusions. 
Besides providing more articulated and long-standing evidence as for example the 
much more recent high-tech markets, the pharmaceutical market allows for a more 
detailed tracking of the process of an innovative project throughout the course of 
sequential acquisitions, due to the various standardized phases the development of a 
drug must undergo. Furthermore, this market offers easy detection of the overlapping 
between the acquired innovation and the acquirer’s already established products, 
through universal drug type categorization, which overlapping would justify the latter’s 
cannibalization-driven incentive to shut the acquired innovation down.  
Astonishingly, Cunningham et al. find that innovative projects acquired by an 
incumbent firm which already holds a product overlapping with that innovation, are 
about 39,6 % less likely to further develop post-acquisition, than a similar project not 
acquired by a firm driven by the cannibalization disincentive44. In aggregate numbers, 
they find that about 6,4% of every acquisition in their sample had the characteristics of 
a killer acquisition. This would translate to the suppression of a potential growth of 
about 5% in that industry’s project development, by that practice alone – a remarkable 
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fact to have remained unnoticed so far. Furthermore, Cunningham et al. notice that 
the weaker the competition in a market, the more intense the effects of that practice 
will be, as the incumbent’s disincentives to innovate45, compliantly with Arrow’s view, 
will further decrease, as its market share increases. 
In light of the above, we might conclude that there is currently an 
anticompetitive acquisition strategy being deployed by incumbents in innovation-
based markets, which remains largely underexplored in literature, not to mention 
policy. This strategy focuses on preemptively dumping competition, which would occur 
by the introduction of new ideas and technologies to the markets, to the dismay of 
consumers and the economy’s competitiveness. At the same time, this practice 
remains largely unnoticed by competition authorities, since especially EU’s merger 
control scheme was designed with the paradigm of mergers resulting in product 
market concentration in mind, and does therefore not dispose of sufficient 
mechanisms to scrutinize mergers between non-level playing firms. Given the 
significance of innovation promotion, mainly through the incentivization of start-up 
proliferation, to the EU’s policy, as well as the adverse effects the practice of killer 
acquisitions might cast on those political interests, it is probably high time the 
Commission sets an eye on this issue.  
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3. Merger Control in the EU – Capability to Deal with Innovation-
Based Start-up Acquisitions 
The political interest to protect innovation from anticompetitive conduct has 
been pointed out in the first chapter. The EU puts too much effort and funding into 
promoting innovation, to have it sacrificed for the sake of a firm’s profits. 
Furthermore, there is maybe not yet widespread, but in any case, increasing attention 
drawn upon the detrimental practice of innovation-dumping acquisitions in theory46, 
as well as in policy papers47. Insofar, it can be sustained that there is a political interest 
on behalf of competition authorities to intervene in order to encounter such conduct. 
There is also no debate on whether this type of behavior would be best controlled 
through merger control, rather than for example through Art. 102 TFEU. In fact, the 
objective is to allow assessment of the detrimental effects of a merger on innovation, 
and impose corrective remedies, whereas the threat of merely an ex post imposition of 
a fine might not be that compelling to the incumbent of our paradigm after all, when 
its market position is at stake.  
In the remainder of this section I will examine whether the current model of 
merger control in the EU is fit to cope with the practice of innovation-dumping 
acquisitions. Lending from the more general discussion on compatibility of Regulation 
EC 139/2004 with mergers in the digital market, I will then point out what (reluctant) 
steps have been taken towards an adaption of that model to innovation-based 
mergers. Thereafter, the role of innovation considerations in the practice of EU merger 
control is examined.  
Regulation EC 139/2004 – Objectives and Limitations 
Let us have a brief flashback to year 2004. Google LLC is a privately held 
company, belonging as much as a web search engine, which is preparing its IPO. In the 
corridors of Harvard University there is small-talk about TheFacebook, a newly 
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launched social interaction web platform, offered only to the students of that 
university. Until 2018 Facebook Inc. will have engaged in 76 acquisitions of other 
companies48. Google, on the other hand (or its holding company, Alphabet Inc.), will 
acquire 232 other firms until early 201949. Both firms will strategically acquire targets 
with innovation potentials and use them as leverage, in order to become worldwide 
technology giants.  
Economy has changed significantly since Regulation EC 139/2004 (thereinafter 
“the Regulation”) has entered into force. In digital economy, especially, one of the 
main playing grounds for innovation, the development has been so rapid and the 
changes in the market so vehement, that not even the most insightful legislator could 
have foreseen. And economic development will sooner or later reveal a need for 
adjustment of the legislation it is framed by.  
There has been in fact recent discussion whether the Regulation should 
undergo some refurbishment, in order to keep pace with recent developments in the 
digital markets, with the main escalator of this debate probably being the Facebook / 
WhatsApp merger case50.  
As per its objectives, the Regulation is rather comprehensive in regard to the 
scope of the mergers being contemplated. In fact, it is mandated in its Recitals that the 
Regulation shall grant control of all concentrations, in the light of their potential effect 
on competition in the single market51. Furthermore, the Regulation itself declares “any 
concentration which would significantly impede effective competition”, which it finds 
to be the case in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position52 as inadmissible 
to the single market53.  
Such an impediment to competition, according to Recital 8 of the Regulation, 
might be identified in significant changes in the structure of a market, which may 
affect that market in a Community level. If Recital 8 is to be interpreted more broadly, 
a significant harm to competition might as well be prevalent in case of an obstruction 
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of structural changes in the market, i.e. disruptions in that market, which could result 
in added consumer welfare and economy competitiveness.  
After all, the fostering of innovation as an objective of merger control policy is 
not only enshrined in the Regulation itself54, but also in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines55, which complement the former. In fact, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
draw particular attention in cases where one of the merging parties is a significant 
innovator or a potential market disruptor, whose significance is however not - yet – 
translated into the equivalent market shares56. Insofar, it seems that the ratio of the 
Regulation fully justifies intervention in cases of innovation-dumping acquisitions.  
However, that ratio of the Regulation is compromised by its own limitations. 
Inevitably, in order to assess which concentrations will cause competition 
considerations in an EU-level, and in order to limit its scope of application thereon, the 
Regulation has to apply a test. This test takes the form of a legal presumption: a 
merger, the parties of which will meet the quantitative turnover thresholds set out in 
Art. 1, will by inference raise sufficient considerations in an EU-dimension and must 
therefore be notified to, and assessed by the Commission.  
This means that, in order to fall into the scope of the Regulation, both -or at 
least two of- the merging parties will have to signal a significant size, that size being 
understood in terms of revenues alone. In fact, the conception that harm to 
competition is an equation dependent only to the product market structure and the 
merging parties´ size in terms of revenues is widespread throughout the Regulation57. 
However, as far as innovation considerations do in fact matter in the current EU 
merger control model, and given the fact that, as has been extensively illustrated in 
Chapter 2, the link between market concentration and innovation is rather vague, it is 
questionable whether the preached objective of controlling mergers in the light of 
harm to innovation is duly being served by the current structure-centric approach of 
the Regulation. 
To put it differently, according to the presumption of the Regulation, only 
mergers between at least two firms with significant turnovers, that will most probably 
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also be competitors in a given product market, may raise competition concerns in an 
EU-dimension and trigger control through the turnover thresholds. Accordingly, any 
concentration that will virtually raise such concerns, but will not overlap with the 
above paradigm, will most probably remain uncontrolled by the Commission.  
This clearly demonstrates a blind spot of the Regulation, where the merging 
parties are in fact of current or potential significance, but in a way that does not reflect 
on their revenues and market shares yet. A potential of disrupting a market through 
innovation, to the benefit of consumers and overall economy, might be one way in 
which a merging party might be significant in an EU-dimension, and the EU seems to 
acknowledge that58. However, the Regulation would still close its eye to that firm´s 
acquisition by a market incumbent.  
There is insofar an internal contradiction in the Regulation, in regard to what 
the Regulation seeks to achieve, and what it is potent of achieving. This contradiction 
and the subsequent blind spot of the Regulation was irreversibly exposed by the 
Facebook / WhatsApp case.  
The Facebook / WhatsApp Merger Case 
The acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook59 would not at all fall into the 
category of an innovation-dumping acquisition; neither was the driving force of that 
acquisition WhatsApp’s innovative projects, nor was the latter shut down post-merger.  
It is, however, the most perfectly illustrated demonstration that in the digital age not 
all mergers potent of raising competition concerns will consist of firms with significant 
revenues.  
Facebook, on its behalf, needs no introduction. Being one of the “big four” tech 
companies, it would surpass the Regulation’s turnover thresholds anytime. WhatsApp, 
on the other hand, although being at that time one of the global leaders in the market 
for consumers communication services, its customer base merely reflected on its 
actual revenues, since the firm followed a little-to-no fee strategy. The reason 
Facebook was so eager to spend USD 19 bn. on acquiring WhatsApp was presumably 
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the latter’s gigantic user database, which Facebook could monetize through the other 
services it provided, i.a. online advertising services60. 
So, simply put, in this case there was a merger between two global giants of the 
digital market, a transaction price close to the GDP of Cyprus that year61, and the 
personal data of millions of Europeans switching hands overnight. Yet that 
concentration was not deemed to have a Community dimension, as per the 
Regulation’s presumption, and the thresholds of Art. 1.2. and 1.3. thereof.  
Attempts to Fill the Administrational Gap 
The advent of the Facebook / WhatsApp case has launched a vigorous 
discussion on whether the model of the Regulation was fit to cope with issues innate 
to the digital economy. If a concentration with such a magnitude could slip away 
without triggering notification through the turnover thresholds, then one could only 
imagine how many potentially concerning mergers remain uncontrolled.  
The significance of that case to the dynamics created thereupon in regard to 
refurbishing the current merger control model is beyond doubt; few months before 
clearance had been granted to that merger, the Commission released a White Paper 
titled “Towards more effective EU merger control”62. The purpose of this paper was to 
give report on the first 10 years of the Regulation’s application, and to propose 
measures aimed to increase efficiency for the future. In this elaborate work, there is 
but a mere paragraph referring to the Regulation’s effectiveness in promoting 
innovation through the past 10 years63; Besides that, there is no hint at all on the 
challenges the digital economy brings to the Regulation’s market structure-centric 
model.  
However, in October 2016 the Commission would launch a public consultation 
on the “evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control”64. 
Stakeholders in the two most innovation dependent markets, the pharmaceutical 
industry and the digital market, were invited to comment on the sufficiency of the 
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current turnover-based threshold model. It started to become prevalent, that the EU 
had second thoughts about the Regulation’s capacity to deal with innovation-based 
considerations.  
These thoughts were put into words in the most formal way, that is by the 
Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, in her speech of March 10th, 2016 
to the “Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht”, a German lawyer association for competition 
law65. In that speech, M. Vestager pointed out:  
 
“To be sure we can intervene when it matters, we also need to know that our rules can 
cope with new ways of doing business”. 
 
 In this speech, the Commissioner acknowledges that potentially concerning 
mergers are not always caught by the turnover thresholds. She even identifies this 
issue predominantly in cases where a to-be-acquired firm owns pipeline or developing 
products ready to be launched to the market, or when it has increased value in terms 
of innovation efforts – the perfect targets for killer acquisitions.  
 In fact, M. Vestager, in what has been interpreted as a hint of an upcoming 
revision of the Regulation66, also referred in that speech to a certain threshold, namely 
the transaction value threshold, as a likely supplement to the existing turnover-based 
criteria. However, the Commissioner called on discussion and elaboration first, in order 
to crystallize the objectives and the direction of a future reform. Particular emphasis is 
also put on the balances that have to be contemplated in case of a revision of the 
Regulation. The ideal merger control model will be the one that picks out the 
concentrations that are potentially concerning, while not putting too much of a burden 
on the vast majority of the admissible transactions, which could backfire on the 
interests of the EU to incentivize the sprouting of innovative startups67. This balance is 
particularly relevant also in the case of a transaction value threshold, i.e. in deciding 
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which acquisition price will indicate a potential competition impeding merger, and on 
what grounds such a merger will be controlled, once notified.  
The Transaction Value Threshold 
The speech of the Commissioner for Competition before the German audience 
came at a remarkable timing; few months later, on the 1st of July 2016 the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics would propose the introduction of a transaction value 
threshold, as part of a comprehensive revision of its “Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen” (GWB), the Act against Restraints to Competition. The 
initial proposal was for a notification of an intended merger to be triggered if the 
transaction price would exceed € 350 million, whereas the aggregate worldwide 
turnover of the merging parties would exceed € 500 million, the one party (usually the 
acquirer) would have more than € 25 million turnover in Germany, and the other party 
(presumably the acquired) would be active, or would presumably be active within that 
country68. The threshold purposely left the target’s turnovers out of the equation, so 
as to include to its scope mergers whose significance is not reflected on all of their 
parties’ financial soundness. After a round of public consultation and some lobbying on 
behalf of the digital market representatives69, the final form of the 9. amendment of 
the GWB passed the Bundestag and entered into force on 9. June 2017. The 
transaction value threshold was eventually set on € 400 million, and the target of the 
acquisition has to be active in Germany to “a considerable extent”70.  
Few months later, on the 1st of November 2017, the Austrian law introducing a 
transaction price threshold of € 200 million would enter into force71.  On July 2018, the 
two countries’ competition authorities would also publish common guidelines on the 
application of their respective transaction value thresholds.  
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Germany, in particular, has been very explicit in explaining the motives behind 
introducing a transaction value threshold. In the substantiation of the 9. GWB 
amendment, it is expressly mentioned that under a scheme which is merely turnover-
based, concentrations in the digital market between large incumbents and innovative 
startups with a macroeconomic significance remain uncontrolled72. The then proposed 
revision of the GWB insofar aspired to readjust the German merger control scheme, to 
fit in the digital age. Taking it a step further, a newly published report73 for the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs proposes a supplementation of § 36 para. 1 
GWB, which provides for the principles in assessing a merger, in order to provide the 
competition authority with an explicit mandate to control acquisitions of innovative 
startups in the light of a possible existence of a strategy on behalf of the acquirer to 
preempt future competition through such conduct.  
The recent dynamics observed in Germany and Austria undoubtedly 
demonstrate a shift towards competition considerations that are dispatched from 
current market-power conceptions alone and are more adapted to problematics 
innate to the innovation-based markets. These dynamics might, in fact, soon also 
affect the view of the EU on the relevant issues, as hinted by M. Vestager74. However, 
the transaction value threshold should in no case be conceived as a panacea to 
concerns related to innovation-based mergers. Besides the technical issues, which 
have been identified early on, such as for example the height of the transaction value 
to be considered, or the difficulty to identify in each case the exact amount of the 
transaction price, there are more profound problems in the application of such a 
threshold.  
One issue would be that a transaction value threshold would possibly only set 
the limit, just below which killer acquisitions would take place. Literature from the US, 
where such a threshold is being applied, points this phenomenon out75. Indeed, since 
from the perspective of an entrepreneur an acquisition by a market incumbent is 
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possibly the most preferred form of exit76, selling just below the trigger might still be a 
lucrative decision. If the transaction price threshold would be set at a lower value, 
market incumbents would only have to bear the task of identifying potential disruptors 
at an earlier stage of their development, acquiring them at a lower price. Declination 
of such an offer on behalf of the start-up would not be in fact very likely; knowing that 
any other incumbent would possibly not make a better offer, in fear of triggering 
notification, and facing the danger of decreased funding by venture capitals due to 
decreased exit possibilities, which would lead the whole innovative project to failure, 
the entrepreneur would most likely succumb. After all, at an early stage of its 
development, a start-up will not hold too much bargaining power really.  
However, the most fundamental issue is that the transaction value threshold 
seeks to answer only half the problematic tied to acquisitions of innovation-based 
mergers. It only provides for a mechanism that allows triggering of notification 
abstract from market structure-centric considerations, and more adapted to the reality 
of innovation-based markets, where a firm’s market significance does not always come 
with market shares and/or revenues. What it does not answer (and does not seek to 
answer either), is on what grounds the assessment of such a concentration, once 
notified, will be conducted. The transaction value threshold, just as its turnover-based 
cousin, is static in its nature; what it can contemplate is what happens here and now, 
whereas considerations connected to competition in innovation are highly dynamic 
and forward-looking. Assessing what the driving force and the motivations behind the 
acquisition of an innovative start-up by a market incumbent is requires a great amount 
of speculation on behalf of the competition authority, and reliance on the theories on 
competition and innovation, which, as has been pointed out, do not provide clear-cut 
guidance.  
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The Role of Innovation-Considerations in Current EU-Merger Control Practice 
 
As it has already been pointed out, and as it is enshrined throughout the 
Regulation77, the model of merger control in the EU orbits primarily around the effects 
of a merger on market structure. What is assessed are the quantitative elements of a 
concentration. Insofar, the pivotal question a merger control in the EU seeks to 
answer, is whether the concentration at hand will strengthen the merged entity’s 
market power.  
At the same time, the model of merger control in the EU is static in its nature. It 
contemplates only the immediate effects of a merger to the merged entity’s market 
power. It does so by comparing two static pictures, namely the relevant market 
structure right before and right after the merger has been conducted.  
So how does the Commission asses a concentration against the background of 
its non-immediate effects, that is the unilateral effects such as increase in prices, 
decrease in product output, or incentives to innovate? The answer is by proxy of such 
market power78. As a matter of fact, the practice of EU merger control at its core rests 
on the presumption that a concentrated market will as a rule cause adverse effects to 
competition.  
For instance, in a conventional case where two firms compete for lower prices, 
the Commission would by inference conclude that a merger between those two firms, 
which would lead to the strengthening of the merged entity’s market power, would 
presumably increase prices in that given market, and thus harm competition. In that 
light, in order to justify intervention, the Commission would only have to prove a 
“significant impediment to effective competition” in form of strengthening of market 
power, as the result of that concentration. The subsequent adverse effects to 
competition are merely presumed and must not be substantiated on behalf of the 
Commission. The unpleasant task to prove an overall non-detrimental effect of that 
concentration to competition is left to the interested parties.  
                                                 
77 Regulation (EC) 139/2004, Rec. 9, 20, 32.  
78 Ibáñez Colomo, P. “Restrictions on innovation in EU competition law”, European Law Review, 41 (2), 
(2016). pp. 201-219. 
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This approach, which has been described as the “contemporary enforcement” 
model79, is well illustrated in ECJ’s decision Ryanair Holdings plc v Commission80. 
Ryanair’s intended acquisition of Aer Lingus was prevented by the Commission81, on 
the grounds that the concentration would lead to a strengthening of the acquirer’s 
market power, which would in turn cause adverse effects to consumers. Ryanair 
contented the Commission’ decision before the ECJ, not denying that the 
concentration would lead to a strengthening of its market power per se, but claiming 
that the harm to consumers which would result thereof was not sufficiently 
substantiated by the Commission. The ECJ rejected this claim, pointing out that the 
Commission’s view of harm to consumers was sufficiently justified by showing that the 
intended acquisition would alleviate the competitive constraints faced by Ryanair. 
When faced with innovation concerns in the event of a notified merger, the 
logic of the Commission remains unaltered. In fact, it is officially upheld by the 
Commission that harm to innovation, as a consequence of a merger, is nothing but 
another unilateral effect, to be treated just as the menace of post-merger increase in 
prices or decrease in product output82. Insofar, when assessing a merger between two 
firms that compete for innovation, the Commission will in a similar manner content 
itself to conclude whether that merger will mute the negative externalities casted by 
the merging parties against each other prior to the concentration, through their 
respective innovation efforts. If that be the case, the merger will as a rule be presumed 
detrimental to competition, subject to contrary evidence of an overall efficiency of 
that concentration, brought by the interested parties in Phase II investigation. Again, 
harm to innovation is assessed indirectly, that is by presumption, whereas no direct 
detrimental effect to innovation must be substantiated by the Commission.  
The application of the “contemporary enforcement” logic also in innovation-
based mergers was justified by the ECJ in the Deutsche Börse AG v. Commission 
ruling83. Deutsche Börse contented the Commission’s view that its acquisition of NYSE 
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81 Case No COMP/M.4439 – Ryanair / Aer Lingus  
82 European Commission – Competition Policy Brief, (2016), available at: 
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Euronext would reduce innovation in the market at hand84. As in its Ryanair ruling, the 
ECJ rejected the claim that findings of presumably reduced innovation rates post-
merger were unsubstantiated. The Court reaffirmed the contemporary enforcement 
logic, by stating that it sufficed for the Commission to show a reduction of competitive 
constraints faced by the merged entity as a result of the concentration, in order 
presume the negative effects thereof on innovation output.  
The Commission followed suit with this ruling of the ECJ in the merger cases to 
come. In Novartis / GSK’s oncology business85, there were concerns that the notified 
merger would reduce the overall firms competing a market for specific cancer 
treatments from three to two. It furthermore found that this decrease in competition 
levels would be likely to lead Novartis to abandon the development of two specific 
pipeline products, which were also overlapping with respective R&D projects of the 
acquired firm. The merger was eventually cleared, however subject to divestment of 
the particular developing products of Novartis.  
In GE / Alstom86, the notified merger would bring together the market leader 
and the firm positioned third in the worldwide market for heavy duty gas turbines, 
consisting of overall 4 players. Besides the adverse effects on post-merger prices and 
consumer choices, the Commission was concerned that the merger would lead to the 
discontinuation of Alstom’s important innovation efforts, regarding in particular 
“GT36”, a highly efficient turbine being developed at that time by that firm, which was 
about to enter the market. The Commission approved the merger, subject to 
divestures regarding inter alia pipeline projects and R&D personnel of Alstom.  
However, none of the preceding cases raised as much attention and 
controversy as Dow / DuPont87. In this case, the Commission departed from the view 
that harm to innovation would manifest itself as the discontinuation of the merging 
firms’ overlapping efforts to further develop already discernible pipeline products, for 
fear of cannibalization of post-merger profits. Instead, the Commission adopted a 
much broader conception of harm to innovation; by differentiating between product 
market competition and competition in “innovation spaces”, the Commission 
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presumed that the exit of one player out of overall four from such innovation spaces, 
would significantly alleviate competition constraints therein. As a result of 
concentration in the relevant innovation spaces, an overall harm to innovation in the 
long run, abstract from the product market competition, was presumed. By developing 
the criterion of a “significant impediment to effective innovation competition”, this 
case demonstrated perhaps the most straightforward application of the standard 
unilateral effects approach to innovation concerns.  
This approach has given rise to a new innovation theory of harm; In line with 
Federico et al.88, the Commission adopted through Dow / DuPont the view that, 
subject to robust evidence pointing to overall efficiencies, a merger between two firms 
competing for innovation will in a consistent manner leave post-merger innovation 
output worse off.  
This most recent theory of the Commission vis-à-vis merger effects on 
innovation has been met with criticism. On the one hand, economic literature upheld 
the widely spread conception that the link between competition levels and innovation 
output are too vague to allow monosemantic conclusions, such as those drawn by the 
Commission in Dow / DuPont89.  
On the other hand, competition in innovation entails attributes that are 
intrinsically different than those met in price competition90. Insofar, the direct 
application of the unilateral effects theory on innovation concerns entails a logical 
jump. Indeed, effects of a merger to innovation might not be as immediate and 
straightforward as the relevant effects in prices. Concerns in innovation competition 
are macroscopic and difficult to presume at the stage of notification. They belong to 
the sphere of consumer welfare and innovation sustainability. In fact, innovation 
dictates on which grounds future product market competition will take place. Insofar, 
innovation concerns are forward looking in their nature, in contrast to current or 
short-term price effects, to which the EU merger control model is adjusted. 
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Furthermore, price competition predisposes that the two firms at hand are in 
fact current competitors in a product market. This is, however, not always the case in 
innovation competition. The nascent attention drawn upon killer acquisitions 
highlights this matter. That is, concentrations between two firms that are neither both 
of significant size in terms of revenues, nor are they current competitors in a market, 
might as well cause a potentially significant impediment on efficient innovation 
competition.  
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4. Towards a More Dynamic Contemplation of Start-up Acquisitions 
The objective to protect and promote innovation in the context of merger 
control is compromised by the two successive presumptions applied throughout the 
course of the procedure. First, there is the Regulation’s presumption that the 
concentrations worth being controlled are only those which entail players of significant 
size. Next, there is the presumption applied in practice by the Commission, which 
dictates that harm to innovation might be predicted where a merger leads to 
alleviation of the competition faced by the merged entity. This approach filters killer 
acquisitions out of the scope of EU merger control; neither will the innovative start-ups 
demonstrate any significant size in terms of revenues, nor will that acquisition affect 
the current constraints faced by the acquirer, so that harm to innovation might be 
inferred.  
Furthermore, this logic reflects a static contemplation of a merger’s effect to 
innovation, whereas, as seen, innovation concerns are dynamic by nature.  
Insofar, a prerequisite for a merger control setting to take acquisitions of 
innovation-based start-ups under the microscope, is the direct assessment of harm to 
innovation, as opposed to an assessment by inference, through the adoption of a 
dynamic and long-term envisagement of an acquisition’s effect on innovation.  
Implications in the Direct Assessment of Harm to Innovation 
It has been pointed out in literature91 that the introduction of a direct 
evaluation of innovation harm is bound with certain difficulties, relating especially to 
how this harm is proven in practice, as well as how administrative discretion in 
intervention is confined, once such a harm is established.  
Proving Direct Harm to Innovation 
It is understandably impossible to define a tactile harm to innovation at the 
point of notification, i.e. before the merger has even taken place. The impossibility to 
directly prove harm to innovation at this point is what leads the current model to infer 
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such harm through observable measurements after all. This implication could however 
be overcome by a dynamic contemplation of the effects of an acquisition to 
innovation, that is by abstraction of enforcement from the notification stage. 
In October 2017 the wave of merger control adjustment to the digital era 
reached France. The French Competition Authority launched a public consultation in 
order to assess the adoption of measures targeted to modernize the French merger 
control model92. One of the main measures considered by the FCA was the 
implementation of a transaction value threshold, in order to cope with mergers potent 
of raising serious competition concerns, but which went uncontrolled through the 
existing turnover thresholds. In June 2018 the FCA finally announced the conclusions 
of this consultation. It deemed inter alia that the transaction value threshold was not 
fit to address those issues within the French economy. Instead, it opted for an ex-post 
assessment of potentially concerning mergers, which would fall short of the turnover 
thresholds.  
By decoding that when inter alia innovation concerns are at stake, intervention 
must be abstracted from the stage of notification, the FCA indeed hit the bull’s eye. 
That way, harm to innovation which appears in the long run might be proven directly 
at the time of its appearance, whereas it would be impossible to predict ex ante.  
Arbitrariness in Administrational Intervention 
Although the newly proposed French approach is in the right direction to 
effectively control innovation-based mergers in a dynamic and direct way, it remains 
to be seen how it will be integrated into the existing merger control system. As far as 
the ex-post control will be mandated solely as a guideline, there are serious concerns 
of administrational arbitrariness and legal uncertainty evoked. In fact, a setting where 
administration could intervene at any given time in the future, and on any grounds it 
would deem as harm to innovation, would tremendously afflict legal certainty in the 
market. This could lead to an overall reduction of acquisition activity in innovation-
based markets, resulting in a chill of entrepreneurship due to reduced exit 
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possibilities93. Insofar, it is a necessity that such a dynamic measure be integrated into 
a robust and predictable merger concentration scheme.  
Assessment - Against which Background? 
The topic of innovative start-up acquisition is one where policy has superseded 
literature. Whereas there are hints slowly but steadily showing up that policy 
acknowledges the concerns bound with that topic94, it is still underexplored in 
literature.  
Most notably, all the attention drawn upon this issue so far is limited to the 
question of how such a merger will be notified, in order to undergo control. Yet no 
attention is drawn upon the background against which that merger, once notified, will 
be controlled. This question is particularly prevalent, since in the case of a start-up 
acquisition the conventional competition concerns related to market concentration are 
not relevant.  
According to the contemporary enforcement logic95, the control would 
probably be conducted in light of concentration in “innovation spaces”. In this case, 
merger control would seek to avoid concentration of innovation efforts in a market, 
which would be presumed to harm overall innovation output.  
However, in a dynamic merger control setting, a presumption of harm to 
innovation is not needed, since the harm per se might be perceived once manifested. 
In this light, the objective of a dynamic merger control scheme in innovation-based 
acquisitions should be to avoid harm to innovation in concreto, that is to avoid the 
dumping of the acquired firm’s innovative projects. 
Insofar, the concentration-hostile stance of conventional merger control is 
irrelevant in acquisition of innovative start-ups. In this case it is the continuation of 
development of the acquired innovation, and eventually its commercialization by the 
acquirer that is at stake. Only then will consumers and the economy in whole benefit 
from that innovation at all.  
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There is, after all, wide acceptance in literature that a more concentrated 
market offers a better environment for innovation96. In order to make this clearer, one 
should differentiate between ability and incentives to innovate. When it comes to 
ability, there is little doubt that the more powerful players are in a better position to 
effectively innovate, since possessing more versatile infrastructure and personnel, as 
well as the means to fund R&D efforts. The whole debate on the link between 
innovation and market concentration refers indeed to the extent to which this ability 
also comes with the respective incentive to innovate. But since the age of Charondas97, 
legislation is being understood as a legitimate means to affect incentives.  
A Dynamic Mechanism to Consider 
In a dynamic merger control setting, tailored to acquisitions of innovative start-
ups, there would still be a need for notification of the imminent merger. The 
notification thresholds should focus on the attributes of an innovation-dumping 
acquisition that might not be altered by the merging parties on the occasion of such 
notification (other than for example the net transaction price). The first main attribute 
of such an acquisition is that the acquiring party will usually be an incumbent 
dominant in a certain product market, with significantly above-average turnovers. The 
second attribute is that the acquired start-up will usually demonstrate a high R&D-
spending to overall turnover relation. Another hint might be that the transaction value 
will significantly supersede the value of the acquired firm’s tangible assets. Insofar, a 
combination of the above factors could serve as a safe proxy to have potential 
innovation-dumping acquisitions notified. 
Following notification, a brief and simplified control of the intended acquisition 
would be conducted. The merging parties would be expected to disclose to the 
authority their overlapping R&D capabilities, as well as the current pipeline products 
under development. The acquirer would also be expected to brief the authority in 
regard to the strategic motivations behind the acquisition, as well as to provide a 
timeline for the further development and commercialization of the acquired pipeline 
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projects. Should the authority be satisfied with the parties’ declarations, and absent 
other, non-innovation related grounds for intervention, it would immediately clear the 
acquisition.  
An ex-post control, in line with the proposed and accepted timeline would 
follow. Should there be non-justifiable deviations, which would hint to an innovation-
dumping acquisition, the authority would be able to subject the relevant pipeline 
projects to divestment. If the discontinued project would in fact have the potential to 
disrupt the relevant market, the acquirer’s competitors would most certainly be 
interested in acquiring it. If no interest would be expressed, it would be deemed that 
the discontinuation of the project’s development lies on purely economic reasons, 
therefore no need for intervention would be apparent. 
The adverse effect would be that the acquirer would ex ante not engage in an 
acquisition of a potentially disruptive start-up, only to dump its innovation efforts, if 
knowing that eventually its disruptive projects would fall into the hands of its 
competitors. 
In that light, the most reasonable conduct of our paradigm’s incumbent, given 
that it is driven by its interests A. and B., is to acquire the disruptive innovator and 
strive to further develop and eventually commercialize its innovative projects. That 
way, it would only risk to submit itself to some profit cannibalization, rather than to 
lose its market position to a competitor altogether.   
In all, what this model achieves is to tie the acquirer’s interest A. with its 
interest B., rendering the conduct of innovation-dumping acquisitions non-profitable. 
It also does so by leaving the entrepreneur out of equation, thus putting no constraints 
to the proliferation of innovation-generating start-ups.  
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Conclusion 
There is an internal contradiction between the manifested political interests of 
the EU in regard to promotion of innovation and the role of innovation in EU 
competition policy. On the one hand, the Union perceives innovation generated by 
start-ups as a key-factor for consumer welfare and economic competitiveness. In this 
sense, it devotes significant amounts of funding and comprehensive policies to 
promote the proliferation of innovative start-ups. On the other hand, its merger 
control model is capable of activating intervention in only a fraction of mergers that 
raise significant innovation concerns.  
The incapability of the current merger control model to take innovation-
dumping acquisitions under the scope lies in its market structure-centric and static 
nature. It presumes harm to price competition and innovation competition alike, 
where the given merger will result in market concentration. However, innovation 
concerns share little attributes with price-effects. They are dynamic in their nature and 
observable in the long-term, and as such require a different contemplation.  
Through this inability to efficiently protect its political interests through 
competition enforcement, the EU falls short of the mandate enshrined in Art. 173 
TFEU: to foster better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, 
research and technological development.  
This thesis proposes a departure from the contemporary enforcement logic of 
conventional merger control when solely innovation concerns are at stake. Instead, it 
proposes a direct and dynamic contemplation of the effects of a merger to innovation. 
This proposal is of course in an embryonic stage, and requires further development.  
The core question is whether the concerns raised in acquisitions of innovative 
start-ups are worth the effort to undertake such large-scale departures from the well-
established current merger control logic. Hopefully this question has been answered in 
the first Chapter. After all, it is rather unlikely that the overall debate on adjusting the 
current merger control setting to the needs of the digital markets would have been 
ignited either, had it not been preceded by reality.   
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